A bill to amend the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to extend the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and for other purposes.
Introduced June 11, 2026 · Last action June 11, 2026
Plain English Summary
This bill extends the surveillance authorities in Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which allow the government to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance targeting foreign intelligence agents. The extension renews powers that would otherwise expire, permitting the National Security Agency and FBI to monitor communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States without obtaining individual warrants.
Who benefits
The National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other federal intelligence agencies gain extended authority to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance; foreign policy and national security officials who rely on signals intelligence for threat assessment; technology companies operating surveillance infrastructure under government contracts.
Who pays / loses
U.S. citizens and permanent residents whose international communications may be incidentally collected and retained by intelligence agencies; journalists, lawyers, and civil society organizations communicating with foreign contacts whose communications may be monitored; foreign nationals outside the United States whose communications are directly targeted; privacy advocates and civil liberties organizations concerned with warrantless surveillance expansion.
Funding & Lobbying Interests
Senator Tom Cotton's 2024 campaign contributions show no PAC support, with individual contributions concentrated in Finance ($14,750), Transportation ($10,000), Law ($9,650), and Energy ($9,050). The primary financial beneficiaries of FISA Title VII extension are defense contractors and technology companies providing signals intelligence infrastructure—including companies like Booz Allen Hamilton, Northrop Grumman, and major telecommunications firms that support NSA collection operations. Intelligence community contractors and consulting firms lobbying for surveillance authority renewal are the industries with the strongest financial stake in this bill's passage.
Political Impact
Affected Groups
U.S. persons and permanent residents engaged in international communications (estimated 50+ million Americans with regular overseas contact); journalists and civil society organizations conducting international reporting and advocacy; foreign nationals outside the U.S. whose communications are targeted; the intelligence community workforce (approximately 200,000+ federal and contractor personnel in the U.S. intelligence apparatus); technology and telecommunications sectors providing collection infrastructure.
Political Subtext
Proponents argue that Title VII extensions are essential to national security, enabling rapid surveillance of foreign intelligence targets and terrorist networks without cumbersome warrant requirements that delay threat identification. Critics contend that the provision permits mass surveillance of Americans' international communications with minimal judicial oversight, violates Fourth Amendment privacy protections, chills First Amendment rights for journalists and activists, and relies on vague minimization procedures that have been documented as ineffective by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Non-partisan oversight bodies including the PCLOB have found that incidental collection of U.S. person communications occurs at scale and that retention practices exceed stated legal authority.
Real-World Stakes
If this bill passes, Title VII surveillance authorities—which have continuously operated since 2008 and were most recently reauthorized in 2018—will remain in effect, preserving the NSA's ability to conduct bulk collection of international communications. The documented outcome of prior Title VII authorizations includes: (1) millions of Americans' communications incidentally collected and retained annually (2013 Snowden disclosures, confirmed in subsequent FCLB reports); (2) use of surveillance data in domestic law enforcement investigations unrelated to foreign intelligence (documented by GAO and PCLB); (3) repeated technical violations of minimization rules by the NSA (disclosed in redacted FISC opinions 2013–2020). Failure to extend the authority would require intelligence agencies to obtain individual FISA court warrants for foreign surveillance, creating legal uncertainty but potentially reducing incidental collection of U.S. communications.
Sponsor
Vote Record
No recorded votes.
Campaign Finance — Primary Sponsor
Top contributing industries
Other$155,502.48
Finance$14,750
Transportation$10,000
Law$9,650
Energy$9,050
501(c)(4) disclosure: Contributions from 501(c)(4) "dark money" organizations are not required to be publicly disclosed and are not reflected in the figures above. Data sourced from FEC public disclosure filings.
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