Connected Vehicle Security Act of 2026

Proponents frame this as essential national security legislation protecting critical infrastructure from surveillance and cyberattacks by authoritarian regimes, arguing Chinese vehicles pose espionage risks through data collection and remote vehicle control. They cite the scale of Chinese vehicle exports (8 million annually) and the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13873 on information technology supply chains. Proponents contend the measure protects U.S. economic competitiveness and industrial capacity. Critics argue the bill is protectionist trade policy disguised as security policy; they note that existing cybersecurity regulations, FCC oversight, and the earlier BIS rule already restrict connected vehicle imports from covered countries, making this legislation duplicative. Critics point out that security risks from hardware and software can be mitigated through standards and testing rather than blanket bans, and that the definition of 'covered software' and 'vehicle connectivity system hardware' is so broad it could capture routine components. They also note that many U.S. automakers source components globally and have manufacturing in China, creating potential compliance burdens. The non-partisan evidence shows: (1) Chinese electric vehicle makers (BYD) have superior battery technology and cost structures that threaten U.S. and European automakers' EV market share (source: BloombergNEF, 2024); (2) connected vehicle cybersecurity risks are real and documented, but existing regulatory frameworks address them (source: NHTSA, CISA guidance); (3) blanket import bans have broader economic costs beyond the protected industry, including reduced consumer choice and higher vehicle prices (analogous to historical auto import quotas and tariffs).