To amend title 5, United States Code, to provide that judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act does not include any evidence that the court determines is not the product of reliable scientific principles and methods.
Introduced June 11, 2026 · Last action June 11, 2026
Plain English Summary
This bill changes how courts review government agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act by allowing judges to exclude scientific evidence they determine is not based on reliable scientific principles and methods. Currently, courts apply different standards depending on the type of agency action; this bill would impose a uniform reliability standard for all scientific evidence in these judicial reviews.
Who benefits
Companies and industries that challenge environmental, health, and safety regulations based on claims that the agency's underlying science is unreliable—particularly energy companies, extractive industries, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and chemical producers who frequently contest EPA, FDA, and OSHA regulations in court. Defendants in regulatory enforcement actions who can attack the scientific basis of regulations. Conservative legal organizations and judicial conservatives who favor stricter limits on deference to agency expertise.
Who pays / loses
Environmental protection advocates and public health organizations who rely on agency expertise in litigation. Federal agencies (EPA, FDA, OSHA, CDC, NOAA) whose scientific determinations become subject to more intensive judicial second-guessing. State environmental agencies and consumer protection agencies defending regulations. Citizens and workers who depend on agency safeguards—the scientific findings underlying environmental, occupational safety, and public health protections become easier to overturn if judges find them insufficiently rigorous.
Funding & Lobbying Interests
Rep. Hageman's 2024 campaign contributions show $8,016.65 from the energy sector, the third-largest source after uncategorized 'Other' contributions. Energy companies—oil, gas, coal, and mining firms—have strong financial incentive to support legislation that makes it easier to challenge environmental regulations in court by raising the scientific reliability bar. These industries routinely litigate against EPA greenhouse gas rules, air and water quality standards, and endangered species protections. Pharmaceutical and chemical manufacturers also benefit from stricter judicial scrutiny of FDA and EPA safety determinations.
Political Impact
Affected Groups
Regulated industries (oil and gas, mining, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, utilities) gain a litigation tool to challenge regulations. Citizens in areas dependent on environmental and occupational safety rules (coal-mining communities, agricultural regions reliant on water quality standards, workers in hazardous industries) face potential weakening of protections. Federal agencies' scientific staff and peer-reviewed research processes face more intensive judicial override. Rural and urban low-income communities that depend on EPA standards for air and water quality face heightened regulatory uncertainty.
Political Subtext
Proponents argue this bill prevents agencies from imposing regulations based on weak or pseudo-scientific reasoning and gives courts proper oversight of agency science. They contend agencies sometimes rely on studies that lack methodological rigor and that courts should police this. Critics counter that this bill effectively empowers judges—who lack scientific training—to second-guess peer-reviewed agency science and the scientific consensus reflected in regulations. Courts already have tools to exclude unreliable evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence. The real effect, critics argue, is to privilege litigation over regulatory expertise and to make environmental and health protections harder to defend. The bill implicitly assumes courts are better judges of scientific reliability than career agency scientists and peer-review processes, a contestable premise. This aligns with broader conservative legal efforts to constrain the Chevron deference doctrine and administrative power more generally.
Real-World Stakes
If passed, this bill would lower the bar for industry challenges to EPA clean air rules, clean water standards, endangered species protections, and occupational safety rules. It would increase litigation risk for regulations—agencies would need to anticipate stricter judicial scrutiny of the studies and methodologies underlying rules. Historical parallel: the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision Massachusetts v. EPA required EPA to justify its refusal to regulate greenhouse gases, but the decision did not give courts power to overturn EPA's scientific methods—only to ensure the agency followed statutory procedure. This bill goes further by allowing courts to exclude scientific evidence based on reliability. The effect would be similar to state-level 'tort reform' laws that raise the bar for scientific expert testimony in civil litigation—those laws have been documented to reduce successful product liability suits and worker compensation claims, making it harder for plaintiffs to prove causation. Applied to administrative law, the result would be more successful industry challenges to regulations, delayed implementation of rules, and increased regulatory uncertainty. Agencies would face pressure to conduct more elaborate studies and justify every methodological choice in anticipation of judicial scrutiny.
Sponsor
Vote Record
No recorded votes.
Campaign Finance — Primary Sponsor
Top contributing industries
Other$396,871.39
Finance$8,290.28
Energy$8,016.65
Law$4,525.51
Transportation$4,331.84
501(c)(4) disclosure: Contributions from 501(c)(4) "dark money" organizations are not required to be publicly disclosed and are not reflected in the figures above. Data sourced from FEC public disclosure filings.
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