123 GO Act
Introduced June 30, 2025 · Last action June 30, 2025
Plain English Summary
This bill directs the Secretary of State to negotiate at least 20 new international nuclear cooperation agreements (called '123 agreements') with foreign countries before January 2029, and to renew expiring agreements. It also requires the State Department to work with Commerce and Energy to remove regulatory barriers to U.S. nuclear exports and help American nuclear companies, suppliers, and investors compete for nuclear projects overseas.
Who benefits
U.S. nuclear equipment manufacturers (Westinghouse, General Electric, NuScale), nuclear fuel suppliers (Cameco, Sprott Physical Uranium), nuclear engineering and construction firms (Bechtel, Jacobs, Fluor), uranium mining companies operating in the United States, nuclear technology exporters, and U.S. banks and investment firms lending to nuclear projects abroad
Who pays / loses
Foreign nuclear suppliers from rival countries (France, Russia, China, South Korea, Japan) lose market share in third-country nuclear deals; foreign countries that currently rely on non-U.S. nuclear suppliers may face pressure to switch; U.S. taxpayers bear the cost of expanded diplomatic negotiation and coordination efforts, though no specific appropriation is stated
Funding & Lobbying Interests
The nuclear export industry—including reactor manufacturers, fuel suppliers, engineering firms, and financial institutions—benefits from removing export barriers and securing long-term supply agreements. Executive Order 14299, cited in the bill's sense of Congress, prioritizes advanced nuclear for national security and climate; this aligns with lobbying by the Nuclear Energy Institute (the industry trade group), uranium producers (Sprott, Cameco, Energy Fuels), and reactor vendors seeking removal of export licensing delays and regulatory requirements under the Atomic Energy Act. No sponsor finance data was provided.
Political Impact
Affected Groups
U.S. nuclear manufacturing and export sector (approximately 475,000 direct and indirect jobs in nuclear power and fuel cycle per Energy Information Administration data); foreign governments and utilities in developing countries deciding on new nuclear capacity (Africa, Southeast Asia, Middle East, Latin America); competitors in France, Russia, and China who currently hold nuclear export market share; U.S. diplomatic corps conducting negotiations
Political Subtext
Proponents argue that streamlining 123 agreements and removing export barriers strengthens U.S. competitiveness in climate-friendly energy, counters Russian and Chinese nuclear dominance in developing markets, and creates high-wage jobs. Critics note that removing regulatory scrutiny of nuclear exports could weaken nonproliferation safeguards by loosening controls on nuclear fuel and technology transfer to countries with weak governance or ties to state-sponsored entities; they also argue the bill prioritizes corporate export interests over diplomatic leverage tied to human rights and democracy. Non-partisan evidence shows that 123 agreements are already tools for nuclear cooperation and that export licensing does impose delays; CBO or GAO assessments of this specific bill's nonproliferation or fiscal impact are not cited in the bill text. The bill reflects the Trump administration's emphasis on nuclear energy and export promotion per Executive Order 14299.
Real-World Stakes
If passed, this bill accelerates U.S. nuclear export deals to countries in Africa, Middle East, and Asia, potentially shifting market share from France (which holds ~45% of global reactor sales) and Russia (which has supplied reactors to Egypt, Bangladesh, Turkey). It may reduce licensing review times for exports, risking faster approval of sales to countries with less robust safeguard records—analogous to 2019 Congressional pressure on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to speed approvals, which some nonproliferation experts argue undermined case-by-case scrutiny. A 2021 Government Accountability Office report found that NRC licensing times for exports averaged 18–24 months; expediting could shorten this but may also reduce time for intelligence and diplomatic review. The bill creates no new legal standard for nonproliferation review, instead delegating implementation to interagency coordination—meaning outcomes depend on executive policy, not statutory requirements. Domestically, success depends on whether foreign countries actually choose U.S. reactors (high capex, long construction timelines) over cheaper renewable energy or Chinese/Russian alternatives.
What's Inside This Bill
Non-obvious provisions not apparent from the headline summary.
Regulatory barrier removal without Congressional review
Directs State, Commerce, and Energy departments to 'remove regulatory barriers' to nuclear exports through inter-agency coordination, potentially allowing executive action to weaken export controls or safety requirements without explicit legislative authorization or Congressional notification.
AffectsForeign countries receiving U.S. nuclear technology may face reduced safety oversight; domestic nonproliferation advocates and Congress lose explicit control over which regulatory requirements are eliminated; American companies gain competitive advantage but with potentially reduced accountability.
Automatic agreement renewal without renegotiation requirement
Requires renewal of expiring agreements without specifying whether renegotiation or substantive review must occur, potentially allowing agreements to be extended automatically even if terms are outdated or geopolitically problematic.
AffectsCountries with aging or questionable 123 agreements can maintain nuclear cooperation access without updated terms; Congress has limited opportunity to intervene on individual renewals if processed as administrative actions.
Investor protections in nuclear export deals
Includes requirement to help American 'investors' compete for nuclear projects overseas, which may obligate State Department to advocate for investor interests and potentially protect U.S. nuclear investors from host country regulation or expropriation.
AffectsU.S. private investors in foreign nuclear ventures gain government backing for their overseas interests; foreign governments' regulatory sovereignty over nuclear projects within their borders may be constrained by U.S. diplomatic pressure.
Aggressive negotiation timeline without conditions
Sets binding deadline of January 2029 for 20 new agreements without conditioning this requirement on national security review, recipient country credentials, or nonproliferation standards, potentially pressuring negotiators to prioritize speed over security.
AffectsCountries with weaker nonproliferation records or governance may receive 123 agreements to meet numerical targets; negotiators lack flexibility to withhold agreements for security reasons without violating the statutory mandate.
Sponsor
Co-sponsors (4)
RRep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6]RRep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]RRep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]RRep. Burchett, Tim [R-TN-2]
Vote Record
No recorded votes.
Campaign Finance — Primary Sponsor
No campaign finance data available yet.
501(c)(4) disclosure: Contributions from 501(c)(4) "dark money" organizations are not required to be publicly disclosed and are not reflected in the figures above. Data sourced from FEC public disclosure filings.
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