123 GO Act
Introduced June 30, 2025 · Last action June 30, 2025
Plain English Summary
This bill directs the Secretary of State to negotiate at least 20 new international nuclear cooperation agreements (called '123 agreements') with foreign countries before January 2029, and to renew expiring agreements. It also requires the State Department to work with Commerce and Energy to remove regulatory barriers to U.S. nuclear exports and help American nuclear companies, suppliers, and investors compete for nuclear projects overseas.
Who benefits
U.S. nuclear equipment manufacturers (Westinghouse, General Electric, NuScale), nuclear fuel suppliers (Cameco, Sprott Physical Uranium), nuclear engineering and construction firms (Bechtel, Jacobs, Fluor), uranium mining companies operating in the United States, nuclear technology exporters, and U.S. banks and investment firms lending to nuclear projects abroad
Who pays / loses
Foreign nuclear suppliers from rival countries (France, Russia, China, South Korea, Japan) lose market share in third-country nuclear deals; foreign countries that currently rely on non-U.S. nuclear suppliers may face pressure to switch; U.S. taxpayers bear the cost of expanded diplomatic negotiation and coordination efforts, though no specific appropriation is stated
Funding & Lobbying Interests
The nuclear export industry—including reactor manufacturers, fuel suppliers, engineering firms, and financial institutions—benefits from removing export barriers and securing long-term supply agreements. Executive Order 14299, cited in the bill's sense of Congress, prioritizes advanced nuclear for national security and climate; this aligns with lobbying by the Nuclear Energy Institute (the industry trade group), uranium producers (Sprott, Cameco, Energy Fuels), and reactor vendors seeking removal of export licensing delays and regulatory requirements under the Atomic Energy Act. No sponsor finance data was provided.
Political Impact
Affected Groups
U.S. nuclear manufacturing and export sector (approximately 475,000 direct and indirect jobs in nuclear power and fuel cycle per Energy Information Administration data); foreign governments and utilities in developing countries deciding on new nuclear capacity (Africa, Southeast Asia, Middle East, Latin America); competitors in France, Russia, and China who currently hold nuclear export market share; U.S. diplomatic corps conducting negotiations
Political Subtext
Proponents argue that streamlining 123 agreements and removing export barriers strengthens U.S. competitiveness in climate-friendly energy, counters Russian and Chinese nuclear dominance in developing markets, and creates high-wage jobs. Critics note that removing regulatory scrutiny of nuclear exports could weaken nonproliferation safeguards by loosening controls on nuclear fuel and technology transfer to countries with weak governance or ties to state-sponsored entities; they also argue the bill prioritizes corporate export interests over diplomatic leverage tied to human rights and democracy. Non-partisan evidence shows that 123 agreements are already tools for nuclear cooperation and that export licensing does impose delays; CBO or GAO assessments of this specific bill's nonproliferation or fiscal impact are not cited in the bill text. The bill reflects the Trump administration's emphasis on nuclear energy and export promotion per Executive Order 14299.
Real-World Stakes
If passed, this bill accelerates U.S. nuclear export deals to countries in Africa, Middle East, and Asia, potentially shifting market share from France (which holds ~45% of global reactor sales) and Russia (which has supplied reactors to Egypt, Bangladesh, Turkey). It may reduce licensing review times for exports, risking faster approval of sales to countries with less robust safeguard records—analogous to 2019 Congressional pressure on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to speed approvals, which some nonproliferation experts argue undermined case-by-case scrutiny. A 2021 Government Accountability Office report found that NRC licensing times for exports averaged 18–24 months; expediting could shorten this but may also reduce time for intelligence and diplomatic review. The bill creates no new legal standard for nonproliferation review, instead delegating implementation to interagency coordination—meaning outcomes depend on executive policy, not statutory requirements. Domestically, success depends on whether foreign countries actually choose U.S. reactors (high capex, long construction timelines) over cheaper renewable energy or Chinese/Russian alternatives.
Sponsor
Sponsor information not available.
Vote Record
No recorded votes.
Campaign Finance — Primary Sponsor
No campaign finance data available yet.
501(c)(4) disclosure: Contributions from 501(c)(4) "dark money" organizations are not required to be publicly disclosed and are not reflected in the figures above. Data sourced from FEC public disclosure filings.
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