Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting the United States Government from increasing its debt except for a specific purpose by law adopted by three-fourths of the membership of each House of Congress.

If ratified, the amendment would fundamentally alter how the federal government responds to financial emergencies. During the 2008 financial crisis, the federal government borrowed heavily to prevent total economic collapse; such borrowing would have required a supermajority vote under this rule. During the 2020 pandemic recession, Congress authorized trillions in emergency spending; future pandemics or economic shocks would face a higher legislative bar. In recessions, automatic stabilizers (unemployment insurance, food assistance) increase federal spending exactly when revenues fall—a debt-ceiling supermajority requirement would force policymakers to either cut benefits mid-crisis or negotiate explicitly political approval. U.S. states with effective balanced-budget requirements have been documented (by the Government Accountability Office and academic researchers) to cut services more severely during downturns, reducing employment and extending recessions. During the 2011 and 2013 federal debt-ceiling standoffs, even the threat of default raised borrowing costs and created economic uncertainty; a constitutional supermajority requirement would create permanent leverage for a minority faction in Congress to extract policy concessions unrelated to fiscal substance. The ten-year phase-in period means the constraint would not bind until 2035 at earliest, but would reshape fiscal policy incentives immediately upon passage.