Proposing a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

If ratified and implemented, the amendment would force either (1) annual tax increases requiring three-fifths supermajority votes, (2) cuts to mandatory spending (Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid) requiring Congressional action, or (3) across-the-board sequestration-style cuts. During recessions, when tax revenues decline automatically and safety-net spending rises, the amendment would either prohibit deficit spending or require supermajority approval—preventing the counter-cyclical spending that prevented deeper damage during the 2008–2009 financial crisis (when deficit spending modeled by the CBO prevented 2–3 million additional job losses) and the 2020 COVID recession. State balanced-budget amendments have empirically increased pro-cyclical spending cuts and weakened state economies during downturns (documented by economists at the University of Michigan and CBO analyses of state fiscal behavior 2001–2023). The supermajority requirement on deficits and revenue increases would hand veto power to a minority (41 senators or representatives), shifting power away from majority governance. The amendment also lacks enforcement mechanism details—Section 6 delegates to Congress to 'enforce' the rule, creating uncertainty about whether courts would intervene or whether Congress would simply ignore the mandate (as occurred with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets in the 1980s–1990s). Military conflict waivers are broad (any 'imminent and serious military threat'), potentially permitting deficit spending during extended conflicts.